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An undeniable signature scheme is similar to a classical digital signature ex-
cept that the recipient of a message cannot verify its validity by itself: he needs
also to interact with the signer in order to be convinced of the validity of the
signature. This opposes to the so called universal verifiability of classical digi-
tal signatures where anybody knowing the signer’s public key is able to verify
the signature at any time. In some applications such as signing a contract it is
desirable to keep the signer’s privacy by limiting the ability to verify this signa-
ture. However, an undeniable signature does not abandon the non repudiation
property. Indeed, in the case of a dispute the signer could be compelled by an au-
thority to prove the invalidity of a signature, otherwise this would be considered
as an attempt of denying a valid signature. An undeniable signature scheme is
composed of a signature generation algorithm, a confirmation protocol to prove
the validity of a signature and a denial protocol in order to prove the invalidity
of an alleged non signature. These two protocols often consist of an interactive
proof.
Since the invention of the first undeniable signature scheme proposed by
Chaum and van Antwerpen [5], a certain amount of work has been dedicated
to its development and different improvements [2,3,4,6,7]. Until the proposition
of an undeniable signature scheme based on RSA by Gennaro et al. [8], all
the other undeniable signatures were based on the discrete logarithm problem.
More recently, three undeniable signatures based on different problems have been
proposed. The first one is based on pairings [9], the second one is based on a
quadratic field [1] and the third one (MOVA) is based on characters [10].
In traditional digital signature schemes, the security collapses when the sig-
nature is too short because of universal verifiability: an attacker can try to guess
a signature until it is valid in order to forge it. One advantage of undeniable
signatures is that the security smoothly decreases with the signature length. As
an example, we can think about 20-bit signatures which cannot be forged but
with a probability of success of 2−20. This probability can be increased in an
on-line attack which can easily be detected. So, undeniable signatures could in
principle be arbitrarily small e.g. as small as a MAC, although no such signa-
tures were proposed so far except MOVA signatures. We can even consider a
1-bit signature.
We introduce a new computational problem related to the interpolation of
group homomorphisms. Many famous cryptographic problems including discrete
logarithm, Diffie-Hellman, RSA are at most as hard as special instances of this
problem. As a principal application, we propose a generic undeniable signature
scheme which generalizes the recent MOVA schemes. Our scheme is generic in
the sense that we transform a private group homomorphism from a public input
group to a public output group (whose order is also public) into an undeniable
signature scheme. It is provably secure in the random oracle model and it offers
the advantage of making signature size arbitrarily short (depending on a secu-
rity level). We (im)prove some security results from MOVA. We also propose an
example with complexity similar to RSA and with 3-byte signatures whose com-
plexity cost is similar to RSA [11]. We hope that this example will be completed
by some various additional settings since group homomorphisms are common
objects in cryptography.
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